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The paper proposes a discussion of an essence, modern interpretation and directions of counteraction to 
corruption interaction.The paper analyzes wide (sociological) and narrow (formal-legal) approaches to the 
interpretation of corruption interaction, examines the causes and forms that activate the development of 
corruption in the post-Soviet space. The authors singled out and analyzed key aspects of the modern anti-
corruption policy carried out in Russia at the beginning of the 21st century. The author's vision of the 
content of the anti-corruption legislation is separately argued, specific proposals are formulated to 
improve the legislation in the conditions of an unstable legal system and a transitional state, and the basic 
guidelines for its further development are determined. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corruption arises and is maintained as a very specific social phenomenon at the level of informal 
social ties that make up a basis of society; it can be found at all levels of the system of political and 
economic institutions. It is no exaggeration to say that, in general, corruption has become in the post-
Soviet space a special part of the way of life of citizens. All of them, regardless of their social status 
and positions, live in the conditions of carrying out certain corrupt practices and procedures which are 
most often forced by the authorities. However, sometimes citizens themselves readily resort to those 
corruption practices for solving various problems. At the level of ordinary citizens, corruption is 
usually represent itself in bribes or the use of certain public goods in personal, family or clan 
interests. The opportunities for corrupt practices among officials and public politicians are much 
greater, and their corruption manifestations are more diverse.  
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As the phenomenon of corruption becomes more and more clear, it becomes increasingly clear the 
fact that episodic and particular measures can not effectively counteract this evil. Corruption is a 
complex and systemic social-legal problem requiring the corresponding attitude, i. e. an integrated 
approach that combines various measures and means. Targeted efforts on the part of the state and civil 
society, and appropriate anti-corruption policy are necessary; the subject of them should be not only 
the state, but also the institutions of civil society.  
Thus, the President of the INDEM Foundation, G. A. Satarov in his interview (posted on the Fund's 
website) noted that "The INDEM Foundation is dealing with the problem of corruption in Russia 
since 1996. And the most important is that from the very beginning our approach to corruption was 
not as a purely criminal problem, but as a systemic institutional problem. Such an approach means 
that for all of us, combating corruption is primarily related to identifying the causes, the system of 
factors that generate corruption, and eliminating these causes "[1].  
METHODOLOGY 
Theoretical and methodological basis of our research are modern methods of political, legal and 
social cognition: common and general scientific (dialectical, system-structural, institutional 
dimensions, mental-axiological, sociological, etc.), as well as special legal (comparative legal, 
historical legal, and formal-legal).  
In the theoretical, methodological and practical terms, this work is also based on the provisions of the 
new institutionalism developed in the works of such authors as P. J. DiMaggio, J. March, D. Norton, 
J. Olson, R. Taylor, J. Wallis, O. Favoro, P. Hull, F. Emar-Duverne and others, where political 
institutions are treated quite widely, on the one hand, as formal rules, normative models, procedures 
and norms; and, on the other hand, as symbolic systems, cognitive scenarios, sociocultural and 
spiritual-moral patterns organizing and controlling the thought activity of people. Such an approach is 
most appropriate for an adequate and complex description of public-power interaction, as well as 
consideration of corruption: on the one hand, as a socio-cultural and ethical deviation of power and 
power relations, and on the other hand, as an illegal act that violates existing legislation and destroys 
institutionally-normal order in society [2; 3].  
The empirical basis of the research is information, sociological and factual sources, containing 
information about the specifics of development of the modern political process and public-power 
interaction. The work also used sociological studies, analytical materials and monitoring conducted 
by the Institute of Philosophy, Analysis and Forecasting of the Political Science Department from the 
Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov. a laboratory of the Rostov Political Science 
School represented by the South-Russian Institute - a branch of the Russian Academy of National 
Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation [4, 5, 6].  
MAIN PART 
1. Corruption as a systemic social phenomenon 
It is obvious that corruption is a complex social phenomenon that should be considered in two 
interrelated dimensions: firstly, broadly defined, corruption should be interpreted as a socially 
dangerous and negative socio-political and extra-legal phenomenon; secondly, in a narrow 
interpretation, corruption is considered as an illegal act and socially harmful acts of public authority, 
i. e. contradicting not only the laws that are in force, but also the interests of the state, society and a 
particular person.  
In modern studies, corruption is interpreted as a system of various forms and practices deforming the 
essence and quality of public authority, distorting the essence, role, purpose and tasks of public 
power. It is no coincidence that a number of researchers note that it is necessary to begin to counteract 
corruption with preventing deformation of the legal consciousness of officials and citizens.  
For example, the development of an extra-legal form of government activity is connected with the 
organizational and legal structure of its functioning, namely with the arising deformations in the 
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political and legal thinking of citizens and officials, with low effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
activity of law enforcement bodies and other law enforcement agencies [7]. Moreover, these 
deformations are expressed in mass phenomena of political, legal, spiritual and moral infantilism 
(lack of formation and gaps in legal, moral and ethical views, knowledge, attitudes, ideas, ideals, 
etc.), nihilism (ignoring moral values, legal requirements, denial of social significance and value of 
social and regulatory systems, etc.) and criminalization (merging the legal consciousness of citizens, 
law enforcement and other bodies with criminal structures) [8].  
In addition, the deformations are also conditioned by the processes of stereotyping, i.e. formation of 
political cliches and stereotypes in the process of public power activity. As P. P. Baranov notes, the 
most characteristic for this form of deformation are the templates, for example, of prosecutorial bias 
in the power-legal interaction of authorized officials with citizens; presumption of one's own 
infallibility in solving professional issues; stereotypes of closedness (almost "bureaucratic 
sacredness") of internal power-legal activity and rigid internal psychological "self-censorship"; 
orientation on toughening of punishment, and so on. [9, 84].  
In the opinion of the researcher, these deformations generate not only all spheres, and also levels of 
political culture and sense of justice. They invade the field of specialized knowledge enjoyed by 
citizens and individuals, destroy political, legal and moral attitudes, feelings, convictions, distort the 
political, legal and spiritual-moral worldview. Modern strains of political and legal thinking are 
largely due to the transitivity of social and political organization of Russian society, breaking the 
traditional values and ideological orientation of development, spiritual and moral disorientation, and 
social anomie. All this leads to a nihilistic attitude to the law and the existing political reality. 
Nihilistic attitude to political order and law is undoubtedly a destructive factor that destroys both the 
political structure of society and its value, and activates the process of distortion of political and legal 
consciousness, etc.  
It is well known that the subjective composition of nihilistic relations includes individuals who are 
inclined in their political thinking and behavior to a delinquent and criminal form of realizing their 
interests and needs, social groups organized for the purpose of achieving their ideological and 
material goals by improper, informal or immoral means, and also state officials, civil servants, 
departmental administrative units, etc.  
Sometimes these groups are generally referred to as "an administrative and bureaucratic apparatus 
guided by the legalistic principles of etatist non-legality" [9, 527]. Let us recall in this context the 
civilism concept by V.S. Nersesyants, where he argued that a law adopted for etatistic purposes and 
violating formal freedom, justice and equality, violates the very essence of the law, its value [10]. In 
turn, the actions of civil servants represent just a nihilistic attitude towards law and to legal reality, 
what initiate the development of various forms of extra-legal activity of state government bodies and 
their officials.  
Consequently, corruption leads to an essential deformation of the public authority and to serious 
institutional distortions, when public authorities do not realize their basic functions, legal powers and 
social expectations. Distortion of public-power relations dynamics consists in the fact that the basic 
characteristics and social functions of government institutions conditioned by the need to consolidate, 
represent and realize social interests (of a person, society, state) [11], are transformed into illegal and 
shadow activities related to the implementation of personal and (or) corporate interests, benefits, 
advantages, etc., causing significant damage to the individual, society, state, and socio-political unity 
as a whole.  
In its turn, in the narrow sense of the word, corruption is regarded as an illegal "act of state 
power" (implemented, for example, by an official) carried out to obtain private (personal or group) 
benefits and violating the rule of law and damaging the state. In the formal legal aspect, corruption is 
perceived as an offense that "manifests itself in the form of bribery which means receiving, in 
violation of a statutory order, by a person in the state or public service of any advantages for 
performing legal actions (omissions) in the service and graft, i.e. obtaining any advantages for the 
commission of illegal actions (omissions)" [6, 8].  
This principle understanding of corruption is consolidated in the legal definition of the current 
Russian legislation. So, Art. 1 of the Federal Law No. 273-FZ "On Combating Corruption" states 
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"abuse of office, giving bribes, taking bribes, abuse of authority, commercial bribery or other 
unlawful use by an individual of his/her official position, contrary to the legitimate interests of 
society and the state, for the purposes of obtaining benefit in the form of money, valuables, other 
property or services of a property nature, other property rights for themselves or for third parties, or 
an unlawful provision of such benefits to the said person by other individuals" [12].  
Within this approach, attention is focused on formal legal (violation of the rule of law, the state and 
the level of law and order in society) and institutional and regulatory characteristics of the power-
legal activities of individual bodies, officials, and their interaction with public institutions.  
Nevertheless, it is rightly noted that "corruption is not really reduced to primitive bribery, especially 
in the conditions of a market economy, free trade and democracy" and, accordingly, " mixtion, much 
less a substitution of the state's activities to combat corruption - combating bribery... is ineffective 
and meets the interests of the bureaucracy itself "[13, 34].  
In addition, the complexity of anti-corruption policy is also due to the fact that corruption as a socio-
economic and political-legal phenomenon is constantly changing. Corruption interaction is a fairly 
mobile and dynamic practice which now takes forms of network interaction. It is very difficult to 
struggle against this due to the fact that changes in the modern society are swift, therefore anti-
corruption activity must always take into account the constant evolution of forms, types and practices 
of corruption relations. This evolution is activated both under the influence of modern socio-political 
transformations, and thanks to the development of innovative forms of social communication, 
interactive exchange technologies and so on.  
2. Principles and priorities of anti-corruption policy 
Of course, anticorruption legal policy involves overcoming a rather narrow criminal-legal approach to 
this problem, which in recent years has been very well represented in the specialized literature. It is 
necessary to turn to the consideration of corruption in various echelons of the state and municipal 
authorities, other structures in the institutional dimension, to reveal the structure, content and 
peculiarities of the institutional distortions in this sphere of public relations that determine the 
required system of measures to combat them.  
Some doctrinal and practical aspects of corruption are attracting attention in the foreign political and 
legal discourse as the most dangerous phenomenon for the existence of modern states. In particular, 
within the framework of this Western political and legal tradition, many researchers highlight the 
economic consequences of corruption, trace the relationship between the politico-legal 
institutionalization of privatization and the "rampant" corruption, reveal deep sources of corruption 
at various levels of power structures, including in the functioning of various institutions of electoral 
systems; they view corruption as a social and cultural problem, assess the place and role of bribery 
in the general corruption mechanism, etc.  
Analyzing the results of work of western authors taking place in the above-mentioned areas, and also 
summarizing the results and conclusions they have obtained, a number of important points in the 
theoretical and methodological plan can be formulated.  
Anti-corruption legislation should take into account a number of points:  
- Firstly, officials in the public sector of the economy may have insufficient incentives for proper 
performance of their duties, given the size of their official salaries and the low level of internal 
control over their activities. This circumstance can serve as a source of bureaucratic delays and other 
arbitrary obstacles for business and other (political, social) institutions of civil society; 
- Secondly, participants of quite legal transactions through bribe are trying to reduce the costs 
determined by the state and existing in the form of taxes, customs duties, etc. ; 
- Thirdly, illegal business often buys from state officials the so-called "dirty" benefits. In the most 
odious cases, illegal business and representatives of organized crime subordinate to themselves law 
enforcement agencies and other institutions of state and municipal power through corruption and 
intimidation; 
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- Fourthly, state structures can be charged with insufficient provision of benefits to private 
entrepreneurs and firms using legal grounds, rather than seeking to buy these benefits for a bribe. In 
this way, bribes clear the market of "superfluous players"; 
- Fifthly, when the number of preferences and privileges is limited, but varies, state officials can 
reduce the officially established number of services in the process of law enforcement in order to 
increase their "rent" owing to them as a reward for arbitrary sharing. On the contrary, if the state 
establishes the volume of proposed benefits below the monopoly level, the corrupted officials will 
seek to increase the volume of services provided to them. They will try to extract the maximum 
benefit for themselves, rather than setting the optimal volume of distributed services.  
Indurate corruption is a deterrent to the reform of state and municipal institutions. It is clear that firms 
that have benefited from bribes, or who remain "afloat" due to other types of corrupted officials' 
activities, will by all means (including through lobbying institutions) suppress any attempts to 
improve the transparency of existing laws and subordinate legislation. Their "allies" in the state 
apparatus will also oppose attempts to carry out reforms aimed at making the economy of the country 
more open and competitive. Such practices also undermine the legitimacy of state institutions in the 
eyes of citizens. 
Corruption in a planned and transitional economies can act as an equalization tool for demand and 
supply. Thus, the state often distributes free goods and services or sells them at below-market prices. 
Often there is a dual price system: a low state price and a higher market price. In this case, private 
companies will be willing to pay to government officials for the right of access to the sources of 
supplying goods and services at more favorable prices. "In China, for example, some goods were sold 
at both a preferential state and market price. And although in recent years the spread of prices has 
decreased, once these price scissors were very significant. As noted by Chinese researchers, in 1989 
the market price of coal was 674% of the state ones. Market prices for some other types of products 
ranged from 250 to 478% of the state prices. It is not surprising that in China, the practice of giving 
bribes through which private sellers tried to obtain goods at public prices was widely spread" [14, 8].  
Privatization may reduce the level of corruption by removing certain assets from the state control and 
translating the practice of making arbitrary decisions of officials into the process of choice stimulated 
by market mechanisms. However, the transfer of assets into private ownership also preserves and 
even multiplies corruption practices. Many of the motives for corruption are comparable to those 
emerging in the process of distribution of contracts and concessions. Instead of giving bribes to a 
state-owned company to obtain a contract and most favored nation treatment, participants in a 
privatization tender for the acquisition of a state-owned company may bribe employees of a state 
body responsible for privatization, or high-ranking government members. It is possible to buy for 
bribes the opportunity to be included in the list of participants admitted to the privatization auction. A 
firm can also pay bribes to narrow down the range of other potential competing applicants [14, 43].  
Many government regulatory programs and budgetary expenditures are fully justified, and they need 
to be reformed, and not abolished. Corruption in the field of taxation can not be overcome by refusing 
to collect taxes; other programs are a reaction to market failures and unmet demand for public 
services and social justice. One possible solution may be to clarify and correct the existing legislation 
necessary to counteract bureaucratic self-will and to simplify supervision. Rules can be simplified and 
clarified with the help of a public explanations. The authorities should give preference to simple and 
eliminate the requirement for interpretation of laws in the field of taxation, public spending and 
regulation [14, 56-57].  
An effective strategy for corruption control should be based both on strengthening the deterrent effect 
of the legal responsibility institution and on encouraging persons who provide documentary evidence 
of corruption. The control over criminal behavior of representatives of power structures and other 
structures depends on the likelihood of its detection and punishment, and on the nature of the 
sanctions imposed: both as punishment imposed by judicial instances, and more specific costs in the 
form of loss of reputation or public censure. Success in identifying the facts of corruption depends on 
the behavior of the insiders who are able to report abuses. Often, this requires a guarantee of 
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relaxation for one of the participants in the corruption transaction, which, in turn, generates an 
interesting paradox in the activities of law enforcement authorities. The irrevocability of a serious 
punishment should serve as control over corruption, but it is possible to reveal the fact of corruption 
with high probability only if a relief in punishment is promised in advance to someone from the 
participants in a corrupt transaction.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In post-Soviet Russia, the understanding of corruption as a result and reflection of serious 
institutional problems makes it possible to identify a number of issues that are essential for the 
formation of the basic guidelines for anti-corruption legal policy : 
1. The negative economic consequences of corruption in the country can be divided into two 
categories: firstly, they are direct losses from corruption, for example, such as budget losses 
during its formation and execution, and, secondly, a set of indirect losses that result from 
corruption, because the latter reduces the efficiency of an economy as a whole, distorts the 
mechanisms and institutions of market competition, and the investments fall. Unlike direct losses, 
indirect losses are much more difficult to assess, and accordingly, the selection of the legal and 
political resources needed to prevent them will be difficult and protracted.  
2. Compared to Western countries, "low-level corruption" or "domestic corruption" is extremely 
common in Russia, when citizens face certain types of corruption in solving common problems 
(communication with the police, traffic police, admission to some universities, conscription, and 
so on.).  
3. It is peculiar to Russia that representatives of big business do not try to perform seizure of 
governmental power (that can be observed in Western countries), but quite the opposite: officials 
of different levels are trying to establish corruption control over business. According to some 
modern domestic analysts, this situation is due primarily to the extremely weak development and 
insufficient legal protection level of the private property institution.  
4. In the conditions of the long-standing transition period of the economic, legal and political 
systems development in the country, the existence of corruption is most often beneficial not only 
to officials (bribe-takers), but also to "bribers". This is due to obvious facts: firstly, corruption 
may be a price for the opportunity to violate the law, secondly, corruption often acts as a payment 
for the possibility of "making life easier", thirdly, corruption is a "reward" of an official for help 
in the suppression of the competitor, fourthly, many Russian citizens resort to a corruption 
mechanism for services to solve their quite legitimate business, when an official simply promotes 
progress of their case within the bureaucracy. It also happens that in the hope of receiving a bribe, 
authority representatives artificially delay ("freeze") the decision-making for a client, but most 
Russians show a very low level of legal skills and they simply are not able to resolve this issue in 
higher instances or in court, the more so that in these structures they can also expect a long 
bureaucratic delay.  
5. Modern Russian modernization is based on a rather primitive model of mechanical transfer 
(instead of reception) of political, legal and socio-economic institutions, their transplantation. It is 
assumed within the framework of such a reform project, that a new institute will immediately 
work and give the same positive result as it provided in another country. However, often there is 
an effect of institutional distortions that is unexpected for power elites and civil society, what 
stimulates the development of the corruption mechanism around this institution. For example, the 
legal institution of bankruptcy in Russia began to be used in order to grab property by illegal 
methods from quite efficient owners with the help of the bureaucratic apparatus.  
Under such conditions, it is clear that the issue can be resolved not by separate "splashes" of the 
struggle of Russian law enforcement agencies with corrupted officials, not through a series of 
high-profile scandals with expositions of "werewolves" of all levels, but only through systemic 
legal, political, economic and moral events, included in the overall scientifically and practically 
justified strategy of the national anti-corruption policy.  
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